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Modern civilization is experiencing the 
early tremors of a technological revolu-
tion which will confuse and unsettle so-
ciety as it forces the reexamination of 
those values which form the bedrock of 
our civilization's world view. We as a so-
ciety will soon, as history measures time, 
bring the vital processes of biology under 
human control as thoroughly as we have 
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domesticated mechanical devices. His-
tory bears the record of what struggles 
individuals and societies had to endure 
to develop a modus vivendi which al-
lowed man to survive the industrial rev-
olution. Law was called upon to resolve 
many issues between individual litigants, 
many of which necessarily involved 
value judgments about ideologies and 
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philosophies of life. 
The development of product liability 
law is often quoted as an area where the 
balance in favor of manufacturers has 
been slowly tipping in favor of the ulti-
mate consumer. The legal system has 
only grudgingly admitted its growing role 
as arbitrator between competing life-
styles. The law has been and will be re-
quired to evaluate the permissibility of 
actions taken by individuals who have 
embraced the new technological pos-
sibilities. These new alternatives will 
allow the development of life styles 
which were physically impossible before 
science gave man the capability to make 
choices in structuring the fundamental 
organization of life processes. This capa-
bility is limited at the moment to the rela-
tively simple procedures such as abor-
tion, euthanasia, and some organ trans-
plants. However, there is no reason to 
believe that the technological revolution 
is losing momentum or that future de-
velopment will not perfect a more com-
plete guidance of life systems. 
The burden of resolving conflicts be-
tween individual litigants necessarily falls 
upon the courts. The procedure, the 
very habits of rational thought, by which 
the courts organize this flood of new in-
formation and adapt to the new focus on 
life will in part determine with what meas-
ure of respect society will regard its legal 
system. The courts have an opportunity 
to reevaluate their values - indeed 
those of society - in order to help soci-
ety deal with its growing pains in as calm 
an atmosphere as possible. 
The methods by which courts dealt 
with conflicts between life styles in Victo-
rian and earlier times were laden with 
presuppositions and attitudes which are 
no longer acceptable. The traditional 
rationalizations were so deeply rooted 
that a member of the Supreme Court 
was able to proclaim: "The constitution 
of the family organization, which is 
founded on divine ordinance, as well as 
the nature of things, indicates the 
domestic sphere as that which properly 
belongs to the domain and functions of 
womanhood .... This is the law of the 
Creator." Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., 
concurring). 
Modern life has placed a great deal of 
practical emphasis on protecting indi-
vidual worth and freedom of choice. 
When social values conflict, there must 
be a forum available which will structure 
the debate in a responsible manner and 
focus the issues. A distinguished modern 
jurist, Edward H. Levi, Attorney General 
of the United States, has addressed the 
need: 
In a broadly based, vocal and literate 
society, susceptible to the persuasion 
of many tongues and pens, and with 
inadequate structuring of relevant de-
bate the Court has a useful function 
not only in staying time for sober sec-
ond thought but in focusing issues. It is 
sometimes the only forum in which is-
sues can be sharply focused or appear 
to be so. E. LEVI, THE NATURE OF Ju-
DICIAL REASONING, LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY (Sidney Hooked. 1964), 
as reprinted in JURISPRUDENCE 967-77 
(G. Christie ed. 1973). 
The legal system is called upon to ar-
bitrate when the existing authority of the 
state enforces a certain standard of be-
havior which is the subject of reevalua-
tion by a su bstantial cross section of con-
temporary thought. The usefulness of 
habits of thought, generally lumped 
under the label of stare decisis, does not 
extend to this area, which arbitrates be-
tween opposing philosophies. Stare de-
cisis can preserve what the law was, but 
is insensitive to what is, should be, or will 
be. Thus, another formula for a rational 
process is needed to replace the discred-
ited, formalistic thought process which 
underlay the classic approach. The for-
mal approach of classical philosophy 
and its use of syllogistic reasoning from 
first or necessary principles is too rigid, 
too idealistic an approach for a pragmat-
ic system of courts and procedure. 
A judicial branch of government must 
relate to the people as a living part of so-
ciety's experience; it must be perceived 
as a source of useful and appropriate 
solutions. The Supreme Court has dealt 
with opposing philosophies in the past 
and has acknowledged the complexity 
and magnitude of the task: "We forth-
with acknowledge our awareness of the 
sensitive and emotional nature of the 
abortion controversy, of the vigorous 
opposing views, even among physi-
cians, and of the deep and seemingly ab-
solute convictions that the subject in-
spires." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
116 (1973). 
A closer look at two of the "vigorous 
opposing views" would deepen the un-
derstanding of the nature of the beast 
that the courts have been tasked to 
tame. The natural law tradition, whether 
in its classic formulation by Thomas 
Aquinas or utilitarian approach of 
Jeremy Bentham, was chosen as gener-
ally familiar to students of philosophy. 
Furthermore, both of these ethical 
theories have exerted a strong shaping 
influence on modern thought and the 
literary traditions in which judges func-
tion. A system of comparison is more in-
teresting when the subjects are suffi-
ciently dissimilar so that any areas of 
agreement appear all the more startling. 
Both of the theories chosen are objective 
in the sense that they accept the exis-
tence of independent standards which 
make it possible to determine which ac-
tions are necessary and appropriate if 
people are in fact to do what they ought 
to do. 
Jeremy Bentham gave this: "[F]un-
dam ental axiom, it is the greatest happi-
ness of the greatest number that is the 
measure of right and wrong ... " J. 
Bentham, A Fragment on Government, 
reprinted in A BENTHAM READER 45 
(M. Macked. 1969), (hereinafter cited as 
BENTHAM). Is [the Greatest Happiness 
Principle] susceptible of any direct 
proof? It should seem not: for that which 
is used to prove everything else, cannot 
itself be proved: a chain of proofs must 
have its commencement somewhere. 
To give such proof is as impossible as it is 
needless. [d. at 87. 
Thomas Aquinas posited that "[t]he 
extrinsic principle moving to good is 
God, who both instructs us by means of 
His Law, and assists us by His 
l' Grace .... " T. Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, reprinted in JURISPRU-
DENCE 89 (G. Christie ed. 1973) 
(hereinafter cited as AQUINAS). 
These standards are seen as self-
evident truths and free from personal 
feelings, opinions, or prejudices. 
"Systems which attempt to question it 
[the principle of utility J, deal in sounds 
instead of sense, in caprice instead of 
reason, in darkness instead of light." 
BENTHAM, supra at 85. 
"[S]ince the speculative reason is 
busied chiefly with necessary things, 
which cannot be otherwise than they 
are, its proper conclusions, like the uni-
versal principles, contain the truth with-
out fail." AQUINAS, supra at 112. 
While they agree to this point, they dif-
fer strongly on the content of the stand-
ards by which the detailed application 
of moral judgments are to be made. 
Thomas Aquinas and Jeremy 
Bentham both agreed that man under-
stands the principles of law directly from 
its source. 
Nature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone 
to point out what we ought to do, as 
well as determine what we shall 
do .... The principle of utility recog-
nizes this subjection, and assumes it 
for the foundation of that system, the 
object of which is to rear the fabric of 
felicity by the hands of reason and of 
law. BENTHAM, supra at 85. 
The natural law is promulgated by the 
very fact that God instilled it into 
man's mind so as to be known by him 
naturally. AQUINAS, supra at 94. 
They also agree that the will plays a 
part in the rational workings of a sys-
tematic body of law, but sharply disagree 
as to the nature of that participation. 
There is, or rather there ought to be, a 
logic of the will. as well as of the un-
derstanding. .. Aristotle saw only the 
latter. ... Yet so far as a difference can 
be assigned between two branches so 
intimately connected ... is in favor of 
the logic of the will; since it is only by 
this faculty, that the operations of the 
understanding are of any conse-
quence. BENTHAM, supra at 84. 
Reason has its power of moving from 
the will ... for it is due to the fact that 
one wills the end, that the reason is-
sues its commands as regards things 
ordained to the end. But in order that 
the volition of what is commanded 
may have the nature of law, it needs to 
be in accord with some rule of reason. 
AQUINAS, supra at 91. 
The basic moral principles of both sys-
tems operate in much the same way as 
mathematical and logical principles. The 
philosopher deduces the correct answer 
in the particular case from the general 
principles. Such a classical approach 
would not normally be cause for com-
ment. However. in examining the use of 
such methods in the legal system, it is 
significant that neither of these 
philosophers hesitated to apply such 
principles of logic to the practical work-
ings of judicial systems. Law is identified 
with logic in general and with such de-
ductions as are found in accordance with 
the principles of logic. Such deductions 
are then considered necessary and not 
merely contingent truths. 
Of this logic of the will, the science of 
law ... is the most considerable 
branch ... It is, to the art of legislation, 
what the science of anatomy is to the 
art of medicine: with this difference, 
that Logic is what the artist has to work 
with, instead of being what he has to 
operate upon . ... [T]ruths that form 
the basis of political and moral science 
are ... to be discovered by investiga-
tions as severe as mathematical ones, 
and beyond all comparison more in-
tricate and extensive. BENTHAM, 
supra at 84-85. 
As regards the general principles of 
speculative or of practical reason, 
truth or recititude is the same for all, 
and is equally known by all .... Con-
sequently we must say that the natural 
law, as to general principle, is the 
same for all ... AQUINAS, supra at 
112. 
That private ethics and generallegisla-
tion are ruled by the same considera-
tions and principles is integral to both of 
these theories. The principle or purpose 
of law is universal happiness, as well as 
individual happiness. At the same time, 
laws are not mere definitions of abstract 
principles, but describe the real nature of 
actual experiences. 
Now private ethics has happiness for 
its end: and legislation can have no 
other. Private ethics concerns every 
member of society ... and legislation 
can concern no more. BENTHAM, 
supra at 136. 
Now the first principle in practical mat-
ters, which are the object of the practi-
cal reason, is the last end: and the last 
end of human life is bliss or happiness, 
[T]he law must needs regards 
principally the relationship to happi-
ness. Moreover ... since one man is a 
part of the perfect community, the 
state, the law must needs regard 
properly the relationship to universal 
happiness." AQUINAS, supra at 92. 
These two brilliant minds came so 
close, yet in the end one can no more 
hope for a final reconciliation between 
them than expect two highly charged 
particles of opposite polarization to bond 
without loss of identity or energy. How-
ever faScinating such theories are, prac-
tical decisions must still be made under 
the pressures of the adversary system. 
The American legal system thrives on 
the rough and tumble clash of opposing 
theories vigorously pressed by talented 
adversaries. Those systems with greater 
organizational and theoretical precision 
do not seem to offer in practice any dra-
matic improvements over our system of 
individual action and diffused authority. 
Indeed, could an amalgam of peoples 
and attitudes which prides itself that 
power flows from the roots (the people) 
to the instrument of that power (the gov-
ernment) tolerate a legal system whose 
basic thought processes and prejudices 
lie in the opposite direction? That is to 
say, can formal systems of philosophy, 
which demand stern allegiance to the 
first principles of social organization, 
such as were briefly explored above, 
successfully relate to a people whose 
only fundamental, unchangeable and 
necessary principle of official social or-
ganization is that no such principle can 
ever be allowed to exist? Mr. Justice 
Douglas' answer would clearly be a firm 
"no" if his opinion in Roe v. Wade, 
supra, is to be be believed. 
Modern commentators generally 
agree that the law exerts a strong influ-
ence on the patterns of relationships in-
dividuals experience as members of 
groups. See generally, JURISPRU-
DENCE, ch. 4, at 51 (American Legal 
Realism) (G. Christie ed. 1973). The im-
pact of the civil rights cases emphasizes 
the broad area of impact legal reasoning 
can have on personal relationships. The 
formalistic approach is evident in the 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), 
wherein Mr. Justice Bradley divided 
classifications of rights into logical, for-
malistic categories and then drew the 
conclusions made obvious from the na-
ture of the logical construct. The majority 
opinion rested "upon grounds entirely 
too narrow and artificial ... [T]he sub-
stance and spirit of the Civil Rights 
Amendments have been sacrificed by 
subtle and ingenious verbal criticism 
... " Id. (Harlan, J., Dissenting) The logi-
cal deduction of conclusions from prin-
ciples used by the majority did not save it 
from the pressures for reform which 
arose from the very nature of our plu-
ralistic society. 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, 379 US. 241 (1968), was a de 
facto escape from the rigidity that the 
formalistic reasoning of the earlier Court 
had enshrined through the principle of 
stare decisis. The facts of the case were 
fundamentally on point; both involved 
blacks who were systematically 
excluded from public accomodations. 
The earlier Civil Rights Cases, supra, 
turned on strictly construed principles of 
public power and private rights, the latter 
case sketching in the broad outlines of 
governmental power under the Com-
merce Clause without apology or over-
elaboration. The basic policy considera-
tions were allowed to speak in their own 
loosely termed language of social con-
cern and probable consequences. The 
significance of the comparison is that the 
steady pressure from a pluralistic soci-
ety's expectations broke judicial reason-
ing from its mold and brought it into 
closer harmony with principles that have 
often been ridiculed, but never aban-
doned. The essence of those principles 
holds that government, in any of its 
forms, should not attempt to fix the 
scales between competing life styles and 
personal evaluations of a proper social 
order. The modern Court restated its 
commitment to this policy decision, 
which grew from the philosophy of our 
revolution, inRoth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476(1957), the so-called "obsenity 
case". 
All ideas having even the slightest re-
deeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial 
ideas, even ideas hateful to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion-have the 
full protection of the guarantees, [of 
the Constitution] unless excludable 
because they encroach upon the lim-
ited area of more important interests. 
[d. at 484. 
The old Court of Justice Bradley ig-
nored its duties as an agent for the calm 
analysis and balancing of conflicting 
interests which arise as a result of 
change. The Court should not sanction 
certain life styles, but it does have the 
duty to encourage as fair a competition 
as possible. Similarly. the old Court fol-
lowed the stern dictates and condemned 
society to endure the pains and dangers 
of a breach birth of full citizenship for 
blacks. 
The Court cannot escape its power as 
a force in society and should not be al-
lowed to abdicate its duties by falling 
back on the seductive and deceptive se-
curity of the classical paradise of syllogiS-
tic logic and demonstration. If the simple 
approach of deductive logic. i.e., a one 
dimensional pattern of development, is 
not acceptable, must society then wholly 
depend on the inaccessible hunches of 
individual judges? Some commentators 
would cheerfully answer "in many 
cases, yes" and pass on to the next sub-
ject. See generally Hutcheson, 14 
CORNELLLAWQ. 2, 74(1929), reprinted 
in JURISPRUDENCE 683 (G. Christie 
ed. 1973). However, those who want a 
bit more would probably conclude that 
what is needed is a pragmatic approach 
which would allow reason to be applied 
under conditions of rapid flux and where 
final answers are not available. 
The modern world would be wise to 
reevaluate its policy choices and search 
for new inSights to gUide the priorities we 
set for the use of our new powers over 
life processes. What is needed is a tool of 
thought which would be useful in private 
decision making and judicial analysis of 
private decisions. It would appear that in 
order to free our thoughts from the webs 
of the old approach it may be profitable 
to reexamine a few truly ancient 
thoughts. They at least will have the ad-
vantage of bringing a little sorely needed 
perspective into the heated arguments 
over where mankind should take life 
from here, if indeed we should take it 
anywhere at all. 
The old approach of the Court to so-
cial issues has been qUietly scrapped and 
a new vehicle for thought is slowly 
maturing in its place. A brief look at our 
common cultural heritage may help 
bring the shape of things to come into 
focus. 
Aristole's pragmatic approach to the 
task of applying reason in situations 
where knowledge is unavailable is singu-
larly adaptable to the judicial system. 
See generally, Aristotle, THE TOPICS, 
THE OXFORD TRANSLATION OF 
ARISTOTLE (W.D. Ross ed. 1928), re-
prin~d inJUR~PRUDENCE839 (G 
Christie ed. 1973) (hereinafter cited as 
ARISTOTLE). Practical reasoning deals 
with matters which are not proven in an 
absolute sense, but which are shown to 
be the most probable means of chosing 
the better solution from those available. 
The types of problems the dialectic 
may deal with are those which demand 
practical answers based upon considera-
tions which are probable and may be 
acted upon by a reasonable person. The 
dialectical approach is useful when 
people are involved as members of 
groups which desire to use reason as part 
of the decision making process. Aristotle 
specifies that in areas where groups of 
society are in conflict and there are con-
vincing arguments for both sides, the 
dialectical approach of searching for the 
problem is especially suitable. 
The modern Court, as noted above, 
no longer relies upon formal logic to jus-
tify its conclusions as Justice Bradley did 
when he was "forced to the conclusion" 
that simple logic was responsible for 
voiding an Act of Congress and not the 
Court's social prejudices. Civil Rights 
Cases, supra. Again, the more realistic 
approach of the modern Court recog-
nizes that judges are persuaded to an-
swers, not forced into them by some arti-
ficial and rigid system of didactic logic. 
An analysis based on the probable is as 
reasoned as one derived from necessary 
truths and has a greater chance of allow-
ing "people of fundamentally differing 
views" to share a constitution. See 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). There is 
no need for the modem Court to hold to 
the position that logic forces final conclu-
sions which must be valid for all time in 
order to uphold the judicial duty of ren-
dering judgment from reasoned argu-
ment. However, an approach which will 
allow consensus must, as does the 
dialectic, avoid reliance on principles ar-
rived at by closed systems of logic de-
pendent on prior assumptions about the 
nature of truth. ARISTOTLE, supra at 841. 
A judicial system which hopes to have 
a respectable future must keep in touch 
with its society, no matter how difficult 
and painful that process may be at times. 
As our society is forced to an ever 
stronger realization of the dynamic force 
of science, its basic principle, the scien-
tific method, will color every aspect of 
our society and indeed of the world 
civilization. The influence of the scientific 
method is already being felt by legal 
scholars: 
In this approach to legal reasoning, 
the scientific method, a conclusion is 
accepted as plausible not because of 
any intrinsic characteristics, but be-
cause its justification conforms to cer-
tain accepted standards for evaluating 
empirically given legal materials. In 
law as in science we proceed by using 
a previously agreed upon method of 
arriving at the conclusions on the basis 
of the evidence available. G. Christie, 
Still Another Model of Legal Argu-
ment. 78 YALE L.J. 1311 (1969), re-
printed in JURISPRUDENCE 1005-16 
(G. Christie ed. 1973). 
In the emerging climate of general 
opinion and legal thought any legal 
analysis which is not subject to challenge 
through experience and newly discov-
ered facts will be unacceptable. The 
dialectical approach shares many 
characteristics with the scientific method; 
they are both processes which help to 
predict future probable occurrence on 
the basis of what has been shown to 
have occurred, or probably occurred, in 
the past. But every process must even-
tually find a subject, and the subject of 
the law is often a dark cave. 
The projected object of the law when 
it must, as a process, deal with the sub-
ject of man's control over life, is a corner 
of that dark cave. Life is itself a process 
which has never followed any logic, but 
rather its own continuously evolving 
process. No one has ever succeeded in 
proving to the general satisfaction of 
philosophers or mankind that life in the 
raw has any purpose beyond existence 
and reproduction. Thus any purpose 
we, as humans, find in life must be based 
on our experiences and policies. It would 
then be fair to say that the purpose of 
humanity is best stated in terms of 
policies, such as the policy which favors 
individual development and choice. 
The Anglo-American system of juris-
prudence has taken as one of its funda-
mental policies that judges are not com-
petent to unilaterally declare facts which 
are not accepted as such by those ex-
perts in the best postion to verify them as 
probable. See Roe v. Wade, supra. 
Therefore, in those areas where objec-
tively accepted facts are not available, 
the courts must fall back on the general 
policy considerations as a basis for deci-
sion. Their refusal to speculate as to the 
proper answer to the question of when 
life begins was in accordance with the 
modern developments of the role of the 
judiciary. As the Supreme Court noted, 
when those experts trained to arrive at 
the most probable answer in a field of 
knowledge cannot do so, the Court must 
not presume to create facts from the thin 
fabric of deductive logic and first princi-
ples. As there does not appear to be a 
reasonably probable factual basis on 
which to judge the nature of life itself, the 
Court must restrict itself to an examina-
tion of the concept of life. However, the 
Court is restricted in its power to interfere 
with an individual's right to relate to con-
cepts and will only invoke the gov-
ernmental sanctions when that govern-
ment or society is itself seriously threat-
ened. It would be a strange argument to 
say that where the nature of a concept, 
such as life, holds so many unexplored 
possibilities that the Court should have 
the right or the power to judge them in 
advance. The Court should not prohibit 
personal initiative where there is no di-
rect threat to those human lives as prov-
en to exist to the satisfaction of those 
competent to make such a finding, the 
same scientists and doctors who have 
given us such control over that life. 
Therefore, the judicial system will not 
be avoiding the issues if it performs the 
valuable function of providing a forum in 
which the experts can come before the 
general audience of society and account 
for their actions in terms of fact and not 
social prejudice. The courts will have the 
opportunity to help society sort through 
the maze of scientific jargon, sift out 
those facts helpful in weighing our 
choices, and decide which alternatives 
will improve the quality of life for all. 
